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Abstract—Biodiversity sciences witness a double dynamic. Whereas the need for 8 
interdisciplinary approaches is increasingly appreciated, most disciplinary 9 
studies are still confined to developing operational, discipline-specific indices. 10 
We show that a reassessment of the general notion of biodiversity is needed to 11 
clarify this situation. We advocate a new approach, according to which the main 12 
usefulness of this notion is not to capture quantitatively biological objects or 13 
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ecological-economic models, in the hope of launching more fruitful critical 16 
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1. Introduction 22 
“Biodiversity” is a new term introduced in the 1980s (Wilson & Peters 1988). Its use has 23 
increased tremendously (Loreau 2010) since the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 24 
1992, in which “biodiversity”, as shorthand to “biological diversity”, is defined as referring to 25 
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“the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, 26 
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this 27 
includes diversity within species, between species and ecosystems” (UN Conference on 28 
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992, Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 
Article 2). Several reformulations of this definition have been introduced in the literature, two 30 
prominent example being Groves et al. (2002)’s definition of “biodiversity” as “the variety of 31 
living organisms; the biological complexes in which they occur, and the ways in which they 32 
interact with each other and the physical environment”, and Purvis & Hector (2000)’s 33 
definition of “biodiversity” as “the sum total of all biotic variation from the level of genes to 34 
ecosystems”. All these definitions are markedly similar, especially in that they are anchored in 35 
the notions of diversity, variety and variability, in effect taken as synonyms. Therefore, in the 36 
remainder of this article, we will talk about “the CBD definition and its reformulations” to 37 
collectively refer to all these definitions. Most biologists content themselves with such 38 
definitions (Mace et al. 2012), used as a basis of a shared tacit understanding (Schläpfer et al. 39 
1999). They usually skip from abstract discussions on the general definition of biodiversity 40 
directly to technical discussions on discipline-specific indices of biodiversity. Some 41 
ecological studies thus approximate biodiversity by species richness (Fleishman et al. 2006), 42 
sometimes weighted by relative abundance (Colyvan et al. 2009). Other studies, purporting to 43 
shed light on other aspects of biodiversity, favor more complex indices, mainly based on 44 
functional traits (Mason et al. 2003, Petchey & Gaston 2002), phylogenetic distances (Faith 45 
1992) or habitat structure (Noss 1990). As these various approaches improve their respective 46 
methodologies, the various indices become more sophisticated and better-adapted to capture 47 
specific aspects of biodiversity. In that sense, the biological literature witnesses a 48 
specialization of approaches to biodiversity (Petchey et al. 2009, Schleuter et al. 2010). At the 49 
same time, however, many authors emphasize that protection, monitoring and valuation of 50 
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biodiversity raise multifaceted societal, economic, political and scientific issues, thereby 51 
requiring a new integrative, interdisciplinary approach (Tassy 2006, Maris 2010, Loreau 52 
2010, Meinard 2011, Meinard & Grill 2011). 53 
Our aim in this article is not to add our piece to an already long list of reviews and historical 54 
presentations of these trends, but rather to investigate whether a general definition of 55 
biodiversity can reconcile these two trends. Indeed, although they point in divergent 56 
directions, specialization and integration need not contradict each other: a general definition 57 
of biodiversity should allow the integrative, interdisciplinary approach to encompass and 58 
combine the various results of the specialized studies, each focused on its own operational 59 
index of biodiversity. Such a general definition would be a clearly articulated overarching 60 
concept of biodiversity, broad enough to encompass all the various specialized approaches, 61 
but at the same time explanatory enough not to trivialize the integrative, interdisciplinary 62 
approach. Do the CDB definition and its reformulations fulfill this requirement? Here we 63 
advance a negative answer to this question, and we suggest a new, alternative approach 64 
towards the general definition of biodiversity. 65 
Indeed, although the CBD definition and its reformulations certainly seem unequivocal at first 66 
sight, it turns out that they can be understood in markedly different fashions, depending on the 67 
method used to clarify and elaborate them. These definitions therefore do not guarantee that, 68 
when using the term “biodiversity” in collaborations with colleagues from other disciplines, 69 
we can take it for granted that we understand each other. This defect undoubtedly makes these 70 
definitions unsuitable for the purpose of integrating different disciplines by interdisciplinary 71 
interactions. The classical approaches to clarify and elaborate the CBD general definition and 72 
its reformulations, which will be explored in more detail in this article, can be grouped into 73 
three types: 74 
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 The first approach holds that the CBD definition and its reformulations are clear 75 
and unequivocal because the notion of diversity, in which they are anchored, is 76 
itself clear and unequivocal. We call this the “ordinary approach” because it is 77 
based on the meaning of the term “diversity” in the ordinary, everyday language. 78 
The other two approaches admit that the latter meaning is more difficult to 79 
ascertain than it might seem at first sight, and that this first approach is therefore 80 
trivializing. 81 
 The second approach holds that “biodiversity” can be implicitly defined, but that 82 
any such definition is doomed to critically depend on arbitrary choices. This 83 
approach thus suggests that trying to find a general definition of biodiversity is a 84 
futile, useless exercise, because countless different, but equally acceptable, 85 
definitions can be carved out. We call it the “conventionalist approach” because, in 86 
the philosophical jargon, such arbitrary choices are called “conventions” (Lewis 87 
2002). 88 
 The third approach, which can be called “the unit-and-differences” approach, has 89 
been prominently developed by Maclaurin & Sterelny (2008). This approach 90 
develops a much more ambitious vision, according to which our understanding of 91 
the notion of biodiversity should be based on an account of a project that plays a 92 
crucial role in the scientific endeavor: the one of identifying causally relevant 93 
units, differences and dissimilarities. 94 
These three approaches are markedly different and, as their more precise presentation will 95 
illustrate, they can have markedly different implications. It is therefore necessary, in order to 96 
assess whether the CBD definition and its reformulations can reconcile the two trends 97 
portrayed above, to start by assessing the credentials of these three approaches. We will argue 98 
that the first two approaches are unsatisfactory, and that the third one, although more 99 
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powerful, misses a crucial dimension of the importance of the notion of biodiversity in the 100 
current scientific debates. In order to make up for this lacuna, we advocate a forth, 101 
“constructivist approach” (Habermas 1983, Gadamer 2004), according to which the meaning 102 
of the term “biodiversity” emerges from a task progressively articulated by developing 103 
interdisciplinary studies. In this theory, biodiversity is not a pre-existing entity, but a dynamic 104 
concept built by the very fact that several disciplines coherently work together. 105 
We should emphasize at the outset that this approach does not purport to provide for a new 106 
measurable concept. In this approach, the general notion of biodiversity is not useful for 107 
specific scientific experiments, calculations or measures (discipline-specific biodiversity 108 
indices are the relevant tools for these purposes). However, the general definition of 109 
biodiversity, suitably determined, is a useful concept to organize interactions between 110 
disciplines and to ensure that the results of each biodiversity discipline can make sense for the 111 
other biodiversity disciplines. This role, unfortunately neglected by the other approaches 112 
toward the definition of biodiversity, can be of major importance in the current context of the 113 
implementation of the agenda of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on 114 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). We illustrate how the general notion of 115 
biodiversity can play this role with an example: we show that the constructivist approach can 116 
shed light on the true meaning of the results of ecological-economic modeling. 117 
 118 
2. The three classical approaches towards a general definition of biodiversity 119 
Although the literature on discipline- and problem-dependent indices of biodiversity is 120 
extensive, after early skeptical attempts (Ghilarov 1996, Takacs 1996) the issue of the general 121 
definition of biodiversity has not been subject to many in-depth conceptual analyses. It is 122 
therefore useful to discuss the three classical approaches introduced above in more detail. 123 
 124 
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2.1. The ordinary approach 125 
This approach is predicated on the idea that a general definition of biodiversity can be based 126 
on the notion of diversity, because the latter is a basic, simple and unequivocal notion. 127 
Although it is implicitly accepted by many biologists, this approach has been rigorously 128 
formalized only outside the ecological literature, by axiomatic economists (Bervoets & Gravel 129 
2007, Bossert et al. 2003, Gravel 2008, Klemish-Alhert 1993, Nehring & Puppe 2002, 130 
Weizman 1992) concerned to identify a general definition of “diversity”, applicable to all 131 
kinds of objects. 132 
Given that the term “diversity” belongs to the ordinary language and seems to be simple and 133 
unequivocal, it is natural to try to delineate its meaning by enlisting the properties naturally 134 
associated with it. Axiomatic economists therefore start with lists of properties supposedly 135 
naturally associated with the idea of diversity, from which they deduce definitions of 136 
“diversity”. For example, Pattanaik & Xu (1990, 2000) claim that the properties inherent to 137 
diversity are reflexivity, transitivity, cardinality, independence, monotony and indifference 138 
(see Table 1 for formal definitions of these properties), and they show that richness is the only 139 
property jointly satisfying them. Strictly speaking, what they demonstrate is that: if the 140 
meaning of the term “diversity” is given by the properties above, then “diversity” is a 141 
synonym of “richness”. 142 
Unfortunately, the identification of the relevant properties turns out to be less evident than it 143 
seems. The monotony property provides a striking illustration of this idea, since the question 144 
whether it should be considered a property inherent to diversity admits different answers 145 
depending on the context. If formulated in terms of species, the idea that monotony is a 146 
constitutive property of diversity roughly means that adding a species to a sample that does 147 
not already contains it will always increase the diversity of the sample. This is intuitively 148 
compelling in some contexts but, interestingly, some widely used measures of diversity, like 149 
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the Shannon diversity index (Magurran 2004), do not satisfy this property. Indeed, this 150 
measure has another intuitively compelling property, which happens to be incompatible with 151 
monotony: it decreases when a species is added to a sample, if the population of this species is 152 
markedly different from the populations of the other species in the sample (which is quite 153 
often the case in real biological systems, for examples when invasive species invade native 154 
communities). To take another specific example, Bervoets & Gravel (2007) argue that another 155 
idea is naturally associated with the notion of diversity. This idea is that, although most of the 156 
time one can order differences between species (one can tell, for example, that the difference 157 
between a human being and a pine is greater than the difference between a pine and a spruce), 158 
it is sometimes impossible to tell how greater one difference between two species is than 159 
another difference (although it is possible to quantify how greater the difference in DNA 160 
sequences between a human being and a pine is than the one between a pine and a spruce, it is 161 
impossible to make similar judgments when it comes to comparing overall differences). But 162 
Bervoets & Gravel (2007) demonstrate that, although this idea is arguably intuitively 163 
associated with this idea of diversity, none of the usual diversity indices used in the literature 164 
satisfy it; they show that the only conceivable index satisfying it is an otherwise 165 
counterintuitive index that orders samples in terms of diversity on the sole basis of the 166 
differences between the two most different species in each sample. In other words, what they 167 
demonstrate is that, although this idea seems to be naturally associated with the notion of 168 
diversity in some contexts, a more precise investigation shows that it is impossible to adhere 169 
to this idea consistently. Similarly, for each and every property claimed to be intuitively 170 
inherent to diversity, intuitive examples can be found to argue that it is not (and a substantial 171 
part of the axiomatic literature actually consists  in exploiting such examples). 172 
The axiomatic literature on diversity has thereby produced a whole series of axiomatic 173 
definitions of diversity, each equating the putative property diversity with different 174 
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conjunctions of elementary properties (Gravel 2008, Meinard 2011). These various analyzes 175 
are all based on intuitively compelling examples, but their respective results are markedly 176 
different from one another (Aulong et al. 2005). This would not have disastrous implications, 177 
if the whole axiomatic approach to diversity were not based on the assumption that diversity 178 
is a basic, simple and unequivocal notion. The very fact that axiomatic studies do not clearly 179 
converge on a simple, unequivocal analysis of the notion of diversity therefore demonstrates 180 
that the fundamental postulate of this approach that diversity is a basic, simple and 181 
unequivocal notion, is unwarranted. 182 
This failure of the ordinary approach therefore shows that, apart from vague intuitions, there 183 
is no firm criterion to decide which properties are really inherent to the notion of diversity 184 
(and the same is obviously true of the notion used as synonyms of “diversity” in the CBD 185 
definition and its reformulations, like “variety”, “variability”). In other words, although the 186 
term “diversity” seems clear and unequivocal, it is in fact deeply ambiguous. As a 187 
consequence, all the definitions of biodiversity that—like the CBD definition and many of its 188 
reformulations—contain the term “diversity” are doomed to be ambiguous themselves.  189 
 190 
2.2. The conventionalist approach 191 
This alternative approach has been prominently developed by Sarkar (2002, 2005). Sarkar 192 
does not explicitly criticize the ordinary approach, but his emphasis on the need to develop a 193 
radically new approach, rejecting supposedly transparent terms like “diversity” or 194 
“variability”, shows that he implicitly admits that the CBD definition and its reformulations 195 
based on ordinary terms are unsatisfactory. 196 
At the core of his alternative approach lie two questionable postulates. P1: Biodiversity is 197 
confined to conservation biology. P2: Conservation biology is only concerned with ranking 198 
series of natural areas in terms of priority for conservation. The fact that Sarkar admits these 199 
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postulates (at least for the purpose of defining “biodiversity”) is clearly stated in his 200 
contention that “biodiversity should be ... defined as what is optimized by the place 201 
prioritization procedures” (Sarkar 2005, p. 180), the latter procedures in turn being the pivotal 202 
tool of his “consensus view of conservation biology” (see his Table 6.1.1, page 153, and more 203 
generally his whole chapter 6). Sarkar then defines different “surrogates” (Heyer et al. 1994) 204 
representing biodiversity in various ways (Fig. 1A). “Estimator surrogates”, such as species 205 
composition, are components of biodiversity that can be directly measured. These estimator 206 
surrogates are estimator variables having “true surrogates” as their objective variables, and 207 
true surrogates are loosely defined as having biodiversity as their “intended objective”. 208 
Associated with postulates P1 and P2, these definitions of surrogates allow Sarkar to claim 209 
that any place prioritization algorithm based on estimator surrogates implicitly defines 210 
biodiversity. 211 
The construction and implementation of such algorithms always involves making choices that 212 
cannot be entirely justified. For example, when one chooses between using species richness or 213 
sub-species richness as index, although this choice can be partially justified, it also involves a 214 
modicum of arbitrariness. Since different algorithms can rank differently the same series of 215 
places, this approach therefore yields a highly unstable definition of biodiversity. This 216 
instability is relatively innocuous so long as one accepts the postulates of his approach. 217 
However, it appears to be a serious problem as soon as one realizes that these postulates, 218 
especially P1 (that biodiversity is confined to conservation biology), are hardly credible. 219 
Indeed, the term “biodiversity” has recently undergone a striking interdisciplinary expansion 220 
and is now a key-notion in several other biological disciplines, especially in functional 221 
ecology (Loreau et al. 2002, Hooper et al. 2005) and biogeography (Brooks & McLennan 222 
2002). Its economic (Heal 2004), social and cultural importance is also increasingly 223 
recognized, and biodiversity has become a crucial theme in economics of ecosystem services 224 
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(Perrings et al. 2009) and ethics (Maris 2010). One could therefore draw a surrogacy structure 225 
for each relevant discipline neglected by Sarkar, each leading to another implicit definition of 226 
biodiversity. MacLaurin & Sterelny (2008) take Sarkar’s approach to be generalizable in this 227 
way, which they summarize by saying that “Sarkar uses ‘biodiversity’ to mean whatever we 228 
think is valuable about a biological system” (p. 8). We would more precisely say that 229 
according to Sarkar’s generalized approach, in each and every case where something is 230 
deemed valuable in a biological system, this something can be used to produce a new, 231 
idiosyncratic definition of “biodiversity” (Fig. 1B). In this approach, trying to find a general 232 
definition to “biodiversity” is therefore futile, because each trial is doomed to produce another 233 
definition, neither better nor worse than former ones. For example, the application of a given 234 
prioritization algorithm for conservation purposes to a given series of places would produce a 235 
first definition, the application of a different procedure to make a public choice in the 236 
management of fisheries would give a second definition, and the application of another 237 
approach to a carbon storage scheme would give a third definition. The three definitions, 238 
associated as they would be with different reasons for valuing the corresponding biological 239 
systems, would equally qualify as definitions of biodiversity.  240 
The deflationary flavor of this approach would certainly make it hardly credible for most 241 
biologists. However that might be, from the point of view of our inquiry in this article, the 242 
main problem with this conventionalist approach is that it cannot explain the nature of the link 243 
between the various specialized biodiversity disciplines. 244 
 245 
2.3. The unit-and-differences approach 246 
Maclaurin & Sterelny (2008) have developed an original approach (to some extent prefigured 247 
in Gaston 1996), which we call, borrowing their own phrase, the “unit-and-differences” 248 
approach. Their argument can be summarized in four steps: 249 
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(1) “In general, the diversity of a system will depend both on the number of distinct elements 250 
in the system and on their degree of differentiation.” (p. 9) 251 
(2) The identification of the distinct elements of a system and their differences is not arbitrary 252 
from a scientific point of view. On the contrary, it is “central to any attempt at understanding 253 
a domain ... because a good system of classification links diagnostic criteria for identification 254 
with similarity in causal profile.” (p. 10) In other words, assuming that scientific theories are 255 
mainly devoted to identify and characterize causal relations, their capacity to fulfill this 256 
central aim is crucially linked with their capacity to identify the distinct elements of a system 257 
and their differences. 258 
(3) Since “history, environment and chance ... affect their causal profile in different ways ... it 259 
turns out that there is no single system for identifying all the similarities and differences 260 
between biological systems that matter.” (p. 10)  261 
(4) The characterization of any given biological system in terms of biodiversity therefore 262 
depends on the theoretical approach chosen to study it, which in turn depends on “the 263 
instrumental and explanatory purposes of particular groups of scientists” (p. 21) 264 
From this reasoning, Maclaurin & Sterelny conclude that biodiversity is “a natural magnitude 265 
(or magnitudes) of biological systems” (p. 6), that cannot be reduced to “a single natural 266 
property” (p. 7) but for which “a phylogenetically informed species count is a good general 267 
indicator or surrogate” (p. 7). On the face of it, this definition seems quite similar to the 268 
general definitions used by most biologists (see the examples cited in the introduction, and in 269 
Gaston 1996). It differs, however, in that: (1) It explicitly emphasizes that the search for a 270 
unified measure is hopeless (which is why this approach is characterized as “pluralist” by its 271 
authors). And (2), it explains this exclusion of a unified measure by an epistemological 272 
account of the reason why different scientific explanations of a given biological system can 273 
differ in the units, differences and dissimilarities that they deem important (“we need to 274 
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identify diversity differently, for different explanatory projects”, Maclaurin & Sterelny 2008, 275 
p. 8). 276 
This approach is arguably the most promising of the current approaches since, contrary to the 277 
other two, it is not marred by any obvious flaw. However, we will argue in the following 278 
section that it shares with the other two approaches two unwarranted tenets. And we will 279 
argue, in section 4, that relaxing these two tenets allows developing an alternative approach 280 
that we believe is even more powerful than the unit-and-differences one.   281 
  282 
 283 
3. A new constructivist approach toward a general definition of biodiversity 284 
The first step to develop a new fourth approach is to realize that the logic of these classical 285 
approaches is based on two hidden unsupported tenets.  286 
 287 
3.1. Two tenets presupposed by the three classical approaches 288 
The first tenet (T1) is the presupposition that the definition of a term, understood as what we 289 
are trying to capture by our act of defining it, cannot be determined by this act itself. In short, 290 
the definition of a term always preexists our act of defining it. The second tenet (T2) is that 291 
finding the definition of a term is a matter of identifying an entity, in the objective world, to 292 
which the term would refer. Here “entity” should be understood broadly, encompassing not 293 
only things and objects, but also processes, properties and attributes. In the philosophical 294 
literature, the two tenets T1 and T2 constitute the “semantic postulate” (Tughendhat 1976, 295 
Meinard 2011). First, let us show that the three classical approaches presented above are 296 
indeed based on these tenets. Then we will show that, although these two tenets seem to be 297 
self-evidently valid, convincing counter-examples show that they are false. 298 
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Most obviously, the ordinary approach is predicated on T1 and T2. Indeed, in this approach, 299 
there is such a thing as the preexisting meaning of the term “diversity” (T1), given by the 300 
alleged fact that this term would refer to a preexisting property or list of properties (T2). 301 
Similarly, as quoted above, the unit-and-differences approach explicitly claims that 302 
“biodiversity” refers to “a natural magnitude (or magnitudes) of biological systems” 303 
(Maclaurin & Sterelny 2008, p. 6), and therefore explicitly assumes T1 and T2. Although it 304 
does not accept it so openly, the conventionalist approach is also demonstrably predicated on 305 
T1 and T2, since it is based on an inference whose validity is predicated on T1 and T2. Indeed, 306 
from the premise (Pc) that various entities emerge as what is optimized by various algorithms, 307 
the conventionalist approach concludes (Cc) that general definitions of biodiversity are 308 
doomed to be elusive. But Cc does not follow from Pc alone. It only follows if Pc is associated 309 
with T1 and T2. Therefore, the three classical approaches appear to be based on the two tenets 310 
T1 and T2, but these two tenets are questionable. 311 
 312 
3.2. The first tenet defeated: the definition of a term does not necessarily preexists the act 313 
of defining it  314 
In order to establish that T1 is false, the example of the term “art” is peculiarly useful. This is 315 
meant to convey neither the idea that biodiversity is an aesthetic notion, nor the one that 316 
conserving and defining biodiversity are artistic endeavors. The analogy is limited to the role 317 
played by these notions in our language. 318 
In a sense, we all know what “art” means, but the question of a precise definition of the term 319 
is notoriously indecidable. Several approaches have been developed. They share some 320 
similarities with the approaches of biodiversity studied above, but are not exactly identical. 321 
Purely empirical approaches attempt to define art by identifying what people typically call 322 
“art” (Kennick 1958, Weitz 1956). Essentialist approaches claim they can identify once and 323 
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for all the essence of art (Danto 1981). Lastly, noticing that innumerable heterogeneous 324 
human activities involve art, demystifying approaches claim that there is no such thing as art 325 
in general (Gaut 2000). 326 
The history of art theorizing illustrates the failure of all these three classical approaches: 327 
artists usually respond to each and every definition of art by modifying their artistic practices 328 
(Pignocchi 2012). Indeed, a given definition can shed light on hitherto neglected aspects of art 329 
and thereby launch creative processes aimed at illustrating or contradicting it, and new 330 
definitions are needed to make sense of the emerging result. In that sense, practices and 331 
corresponding theories co-evolve in possibly endless parallel evolutions. Contrary to what T1 332 
claims, the definition of the term is not independent of theorists’ attempts at defining it: it is 333 
not preexisting. However, the fact that no definitive definition of art may ever be reached does 334 
not mean that trying to define “art” is wishful thinking. Quite the contrary, it means that 335 
striving to define art is taking part in the construction of art itself (for another example, 336 
illustrating that a rejection of T1 is not confined to aesthetic issues, see Dworkin’s (1998) 337 
approach to law). 338 
 339 
3.3. The second tenet defeated: defining a term is not necessarily a matter of identifying 340 
an entity 341 
It might seem at first sight that a term cannot be meaningful at all if it cannot be defined as 342 
referring to a preexisting entity. However, some very common terms, undoubtedly 343 
meaningful, do not function like this. The term “hello” is an apt example. If one were pressed 344 
to define this term, it would be pointless to strive to identify an entity to which the term would 345 
refer. One had better try to identify the role played by the term in our language: “hello” is 346 
used to greet, and there is nothing more to say to define the term (Searle 1969). 347 
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However, this example of the term “hello” might seem irrelevant to an inquiry into the 348 
meaning of “biodiversity” because, contrary to “biodiversity”, it is not a noun. But an 349 
approach paralleling the one to “hello” proves to be fruitful in the case of numerous nouns as 350 
well. Think about the noun “legitimacy”: trying to identify the role it plays in our language is 351 
undoubtedly a more promising route to define it than pretending to identify an entity to which 352 
it would refer. 353 
This approach to definitions, according to which defining a term is first and foremost a matter 354 
of identifying what the term is useful for (rather than what it refers to), originates in the work 355 
of Wittgenstein (2001) and Austin (1975), and has been developed by the school of ordinary 356 
language philosophy (Soames 2003) and other so-called pragmatic linguists (Szabò 2006). 357 
Identifying the role played by terms like “hello” in our language is obviously easier than 358 
identifying the role played by terms like “biodiversity”. However, the philosophical 359 
arguments articulated above show that rigorously defining the term “biodiversity” is not 360 
necessarily identifying an entity (be it a set a objects, processes, properties or magnitudes) to 361 
which the term would refer nor providing for a definitive formula. It is rather scrutinizing 362 
what kind of role the notion plays in our language, assessing if it is useful at all, and if it is, 363 
eventually showing what it is useful for. Since, in this approach, using the term “biodiversity” 364 
and trying to define it are taking part in the construction of the concept itself, we call this 365 
approach “constructivist”. 366 
 367 
4. The key-question of the constructivist approach: what is the general notion of 368 
biodiversity useful for? 369 
In order to illustrate how our constructivist approach works and how useful it can be, let us 370 
see what help it can provide in a practical example of valuation: the fishery in the Aleutian 371 
marine ecosystem studied by Estes et al. (1998), Finnoff & Tschirhart (2003) and Eichner & 372 
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Tschirhart (2007), among others (Fig. 2). According to standard economics, fisheries and 373 
associated ecosystems face several problems of externalities (Perrings 2009). In what follows, 374 
we will focus on one of them: the risk that repercussions of the overexploitation of one 375 
resource are not being taken into account in the determination of consumers’ behavior. In the 376 
example chosen, human consumers buy items of one species (pollock) on markets and thereby 377 
indirectly impact other species due to interactions in the ecological system. This indirect 378 
impact can in turn alter the provision of various ecological services. Most variants of this 379 
problem, and the alleged solutions provided by the standard economic approach, are 380 
articulated in terms of “biodiversity” in most publications. The first step of the constructivist 381 
approach is to ask if this formulation makes any difference. If it does, this means that the term 382 
“biodiversity” plays a role (or, equivalently, has a function) in these discourses, and the 383 
second step of a constructivist approach is then to use this function. If it turns out that this 384 
two-steps procedure is feasible and can be generalized, just like we illustrate a definition of 385 
“hello” by greeting people, we will have produced a definition of “biodiversity” by showing 386 
what the general notion of biodiversity is useful for. 387 
 388 
4.1. The first step of the constructivist approach: ascertain whether the term has a function 389 
and if so, identify it 390 
According to standard economics, if ecologists and economists manage to condense all the 391 
information contained in the ecological network into an increase of the price of pollock (for 392 
example through taxes imposed on harvesting activities or a cap on harvest), demand will 393 
drop, overfishing will cease, kelp will recover, etc. (Finnoff & Tschirhart 2003). This 394 
conclusion could be articulated in economic terms alone, but as a matter of fact economists 395 
often make the effort to translate it in terms of “biodiversity”. 396 
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If either the conventionalist or the unit-and-difference approach were true, as explained 397 
above, it would mean that, when an economist says “biodiversity”, what she or he has in mind 398 
is entirely determined by purely economic concepts (utility functions, social planner’s 399 
optimization and the like), and is completely different from what an ecologist has in mind 400 
when using the same term. In its application to the economic problem at issue here, this idea 401 
is patently implausible. Indeed, economists would not bother translating their results in terms 402 
of “biodiversity” if the only expected result were to translate the message from one jargon 403 
accessible only to economists, to another jargon just as much esoteric. If economists so 404 
forcefully insist on translating their results in terms of “biodiversity”, it can only be because 405 
they tacitly claim that their results are relevant for other biodiversity sciences. This point, 406 
regrettably ignored by the classical approaches to the general definition of biodiversity 407 
(including the most promising unit-and-difference approach), can be generalized to all 408 
discourses articulated in terms of “biodiversity”. As soon as one expresses or translates one’s 409 
disciplinary discourse in the general terms of “biodiversity”, one claims (or at least one is 410 
committed to claim) that what one says is relevant beyond one’s own disciplinary borders—411 
relevant for all the other disciplines making, as a matter of fact, similar credible claims. 412 
But a claim (emitted by one or several speaker(s)) is always directed at one or several 413 
hearer(s), and is predicated on its acceptability by this audience (Habermas 1981). For 414 
example, if speaker S utters “I am the Commander of this crew”, this utterance cannot qualify 415 
as a claim properly speaking if S is alone in the desert or if he is one ordinary seaman among 416 
others in the crew he speaks to: in such cases S’s utterance is a vain one (or a joke). It cannot 417 
be a claim properly speaking unless S utters it before a crew that is liable to accept it (which 418 
can be the case, e.g., if the real commander is no longer able to honor his duty and S is the 419 
second-highest ranked official). A more comprehensive reformulation of the constructivist 420 
idea is therefore: for the speaker (or writer), the function of the term “biodiversity” is to claim 421 
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general relevance of his results; for the hearer (or reader or analyst), it is to critically assess 422 
the credentials of this purported relevance of the results. 423 
 424 
4.2. The second step of the constructivist approach: use the function of the term 425 
If implemented in the case of ecological-economic modeling, the constructivist approach thus 426 
holds that using the term “biodiversity”, and thereby constructing its definition, is asking the 427 
question: do the results of ecological economic models qualify as relevant, beyond economics 428 
alone, to all biodiversity disciplines? 429 
 430 
4.2.1. Disciplinary assumptions 431 
One important issue to assess this putative relevance is whether the basic assumptions 432 
postulated by these models can be taken for granted in a more general context. Typically, 433 
these studies postulate that it is possible to achieve a perfect knowledge of the ecological 434 
mechanisms and that the behavior of the economic agents can be perfectly foreseeable (and 435 
modeled by a utility function). One problem created by these assumptions is that the models 436 
based on them prescribe to concentrate and confine all the relevant information into prices, 437 
which in turn incites consumers to think only about their own money. Take for example the 438 
detrimental effects of the production, commercialization and usage of marketed products on 439 
insect pollinators and the ensuing ecological consequences (Gallai et al. 2009). If all these 440 
detrimental effects were already integrated in their price, there would be no need for 441 
consumers to think about anything else than prices: seeing that prices are high, they would 442 
eschew buying these products and the detrimental effects would thereby be avoided. In this 443 
scenario, consumers would not need to know that the reason why the price of a given product 444 
is high is that it has detrimental effects on pollinators, and it would therefore be unnecessary 445 
for ecologists and economists to invest time and money to diffuse ecological information. 446 
 19
Similarly, consumers would not need to adapt their preferences to the environmental 447 
constraints and to organize their decision-making in an intelligent, long-term horizon (Singer 448 
2004). 449 
If only the prospect of ever being able to integrate into prices all the ecological information, 450 
concerning all the ecological mechanisms all around the world, were a credible one, it might 451 
be worth investigating this strategy. Unfortunately, it is widely acknowledged that this 452 
prospect is an unachievable, fanciful one (Barbier 2000): in the real world, perfect knowledge 453 
is unachievable even for the best scientists and prices therefore cannot integrate all the 454 
ecological information. The optimum calculated by the model being unachievable, the latter 455 
faces a so-called “problem of the second best” (Lipsey & Lancaster 1956-57): there is no 456 
logical guarantee that acting as if the optimum were achievable (that is to say: endorsing the 457 
standard assumptions and thereby promoting the creation of incentives for consumers to 458 
develop a self-centered, short-sighted and uninformed behavior) will be conducive to the 459 
second best result. It is possible that achieving the second best requires a completely different 460 
strategy, for example that consumers precisely do not behave in a self-centered, short-sighted 461 
and uninformed way. Therefore, although the standard economic approach is undoubtedly 462 
valid within the framework defined by its disciplinary assumptions, it could have very 463 
destructive effects if other biodiversity disciplines were to mistake the standard economic 464 
results as being applicable to the real world (whereas, due to the problem of the second best, 465 
they are in fact only applicable to fictitious worlds where the optimum is achievable). 466 
When using the term “biodiversity” in presenting their results, economists claim that their 467 
results are relevant outside their discipline; but using the term “biodiversity” as critical 468 
readers of these economic arguments, we see that this claim must be rejected. This example 469 
thus illustrates that taking seriously the implicit claims of generality encapsulated in the term 470 
“biodiversity” and critically assessing its credentials is a very rewarding exercise, because it 471 
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shows why disciplinary approaches can fail to solve integrated, interdisciplinary biodiversity 472 
issues all by themselves, and where and why they are flawed. As additional illustrations of 473 
this heuristic role we proceed by showing that the constructivist approach can shed light on 474 
three crucial components of the biodiversity issues presented in the fishery example that are 475 
obscured by the standard economic approach. 476 
 477 
4.2.2. What counts as a solution? 478 
What if consumers were willing to pay the increased price calculated according to standard 479 
economics, and thereby go on impacting the environment? Clark (1999) showed that, if this 480 
possibility is admitted, it can be economically rational to exploit species to extinction. 481 
However, the latter case is ignored without justification in most current models. For example, 482 
Eichner & Tschirhart (2007) simply state, in a foot-note, without any explanation: “[t]he 483 
question of optimal extinction is beyond the scope of the present paper” (note 15, p. 744). If 484 
“optimal extinction” is a solution to the management problem under standard economics, why 485 
then does it ignore it? The constructivist approach suggests that the reason is that, in practice, 486 
standard economics theorists vaguely see that optimal extinction cannot qualify as a solution 487 
in the context of an interaction between economics and other biodiversity disciplines. The 488 
very fact that these studies present themselves as economic studies of biodiversity constrains 489 
the kind of result that they can present as genuine solutions more strongly than if they would 490 
simply present themselves as economic studies of entities that happen to be independently 491 
called “biodiversity” by biologists.  492 
 493 
 494 
4.2.3. The moral underpinnings of valuation methods 495 
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Conveniently enough, the neglect of optimal extinctions also makes it look as though 496 
ecological-economic modeling is a purely scientific, value-neutral exercise. But as soon as 497 
one accepts that such problems might empirically arise, it becomes clear that standard 498 
economics makes two incompatible moral claims. On the one hand, standard economics 499 
postulates that ecological and economic experts are justified to manipulate prices, and thereby 500 
people’s behavior. This claim is undeniably a moral one, and consistently maintaining it 501 
would imply that experts should be the only ones to take the rein of ecosystem management. 502 
But supporters of standard economics forcefully reject this implication, since their models are 503 
based on the idea that, so long as ecological consequences are integrated in prices, consumers 504 
should be authorized to act freely on markets. In that sense, they admit that experts cannot 505 
simply take all the decisions on behalf of the larger society (Estlund 2008). At the very least, 506 
economic methods have to admit the moral status of these premises, and to clarify them. 507 
 508 
4.2.4. Qualitative information and the formation of preferences 509 
By positing that consumers should act freely on markets, standard economics thus assumes 510 
that consumers’ and citizens’ preferences must somehow be taken into account and respected 511 
(Sen 1973). This undeniably moral premise is, in one form or another, shared by the vast 512 
majority of the current philosophical (Kymlicka 2002) and economic (Sen 2008) literature, 513 
and is hence arguably not very controversial. Our critical examination of the application of 514 
standard economics to the fisheries issue however suggests that the internal coherence of 515 
ecological-economic models in their endorsement of this premise is doubtful. Indeed, if one 516 
decides to respect preferences, one has to make sure that the preferences purportedly 517 
respected are conveniently formed. Ecological-economic models will therefore remain 518 
internally incoherent so long as they do not investigate whether, in addition to or instead of 519 
the integration of ecological information into prices, the very construction of preferences 520 
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requires that consumers understand the concrete ecological consequences of their acts, 521 
evaluate them with regard to the values they hold, and thereby make reflexive choices (Sagoff 522 
2008, Meinard & Grill 2011). 523 
 524 
Altogether, our critical analysis in this section does not mean that economics is irrelevant to 525 
the resolution of biodiversity issues. It simply shows that, as they stand, these approaches do 526 
not live up to the expectations aroused by the formulation of their results in terms of 527 
“biodiversity”. But if standard economists take seriously and endorse our constructivist 528 
approach, this demonstration of their failure can turn into the first step of a fruitful critical 529 
dialog. Indeed, a simple clarification and open admission by economists of the various 530 
presuppositions of their approaches would already considerably strengthen the quality of 531 
collaborations between economists and biologists. This could be the first step towards 532 
collaborations through which economists and biologists could participate in a reorientation of 533 
economic models liable to make the latter more relevant to the resolution of environmental 534 
issues. 535 
Besides, although our explanation in this article has been centered on an example of 536 
interactions between economics and ecology, the logic elaborated above is applicable to the 537 
other interdisciplinary interactions as well. For example, just like economic studies, 538 
anthropological studies presenting themselves as studies of biodiversity thereby implicitly 539 
claim that they are relevant to the other biodiversity studies, outside anthropology. Contrary to 540 
economic studies, most of these studies openly acknowledge that they are not ethically 541 
neutral, for example, when they (more or less openly) promote an approach in which local 542 
stakeholders take the reins of environmental management (e.g. Mougenot 2003). But they do 543 
not investigate whether, and to what extent, their specific ethical stances can constrain the 544 
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possibility for them to participate, on a par with ecological studies, to the resolution of 545 
common problems. 546 
And what is true of interactions between disciplines is also true of interactions between 547 
scientists and political decision makers. According to our constructivist approach, these 548 
interactions could be considerably enriched if, instead of postulating that “biodiversity” must 549 
refer to a supposedly clearly identified entity, both scientists and decision makers were to 550 
admit that talking about “biodiversity” to one another commits them to engage in a 551 
collaborative process of clarification of the problems they wish to solve. 552 
 553 
5. Conclusions 554 
Many authors are prone to emphasize the interdisciplinary status of the concept of 555 
biodiversity, or to stress that it is a “bridge concept” (Norton 2008) liable to link scientific 556 
practices and public discourse. But the possibility for this notion to be a bridge concept 557 
requires a comprehensive explanation. Our explanation in this article is based on the idea that 558 
the term “biodiversity” does not refer to a pre-existing entity: its meaning is given by its 559 
function in our language, and this function is not primarily a referential one. The function of 560 
the term "biodiversity" is the following: it is a term used to present results, ideas and projects 561 
in such a way as to claim that they are relevant, beyond their home discipline, to all the 562 
disciplines and discourses that happen to use the term. In this approach, biodiversity is a 563 
bridge concept indeed, because its function in our language is such that, using the term 564 
“biodiversity” commits the user to claim, and to be able to redeem her or his claim, that what 565 
she or he says about biodiversity is relevant for the other users of the term. 566 
When an ecologist is done with the purely ecological part of the study of an ecological-567 
economic system, the easiest way for her or him to proceed is to hand over the case to an 568 
economist who will study it independently. In our rationale, the interdisciplinary study of 569 
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biodiversity is not that kind of relay race. It is rather an attitude that consists in taking 570 
advantage of insights from as many disciplines as possible to shed light on basic problems or 571 
presuppositions in order to constructively criticize them. 572 
This form of interdisciplinarity, that is according to our logic a crucial part of the agenda of 573 
the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 574 
(IPBES), is not an easy task. It involves tackling the notion of biodiversity in a truly 575 
integrative way, critically assessing the scientific credentials of various accepted methods, and 576 
confronting the novelty of the environmental challenges. Our approach hence suggests that 577 
biodiversity sciences have a philosophical and societal relevance, and that biologists should 578 
not be afraid to take a more affirmative stance and to engage more vigorously in the 579 
resolution of biodiversity issues—be it by critically appraising current valuation methods, 580 
participating in the diffusion of ecological knowledge, invigorating philosophical and political 581 
debates, or engaging in the creation of relevant institutions. 582 
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Property Formal definition 
Reflexivity For all a, Xa≥Xa  
Transitivity For all a, b, c, if Xa≥Xb and Xb≥Xc then Xa≥Xc
Indifference For all i, j, {i}~{j} 
Monotony For all i, j, if i and j belong to the same species then {i}~(i,j), 
otherwise {i}<(i,j) 
Independence If neither Xa nor Xb contain i, then Xa>Xb if and only if 
XaU{i}>XbU{i}  
Table 1 729 
i, j are individuals. Xa, Xb, Xc are samples to be compared. “>” stands for “is strictly more 730 





Figure 1. A. Surrogacy relations according to the conventionalist approach. B. Generalization 735 
to other biodiversity sciences (this involves calling “surrogates” some concepts usually not 736 
considered to be surrogates of biodiversity, e.g. ecosystem services). 737 
 33
 738 
Figure 2. Consumers A1... Ai consume pollocks. Overexploitation of pollocks leads to a 739 
decrease of their predators stellar sea lions. As a consequence, killer whales consume sea-740 
otters, themselves consuming sea urchins, themselves grazing on kelp. Kelp being nurseries 741 
for innumerable fish species consumed by human consumers A1... Ai and B1... Bj, overfishing 742 
pollock has an indirect impact on all these consumers. 743 
